We find little evidence of institutional decay when examining several of China’s quasi-democratic institutions. Opportunities for contentious participation-defined as disruptive behavior ranging from grassroots advocacy to outright protests-have been severely restricted however, formal institutions for participation that expanded under Hu Jintao continue to provide channels for dialogue between local officials and citizens across China. It argues that there are both continuities and discontinuities in political participation during the transition.

This article interrogates the prevailing narrative that pathways to grassroots political participation have narrowed in the transition from Hu Jintao (2002–12) to Xi Jinping (2013–present). By most accounts, the present administration has departed from previous trajectories by closing political opportunity structures for participation and backtracking on incremental liberalization. Be it the disappearance of Hong Kong publishers of politically sensitive books or a crackdown on mainland labor activists, lawyers, feminists, and protestant churches, the state has aggressively policed boundary pushers. 1 Headlines have declared a sweeping transformation in politics under Xi, from the broad-reaching anticorruption drive to a strong-arm campaign against grassroots civil society. Xi became the “core leader” ( hexin lingdao 核心领导) and assumed the title of military commander in chief in 2016. Since Xi Jinping took office in China, state power has become increasingly personalized.

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